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Supporting Data (details). Palestinian economist Basel Saleh compiled information on 171
militants killed in action (nearly all during the Second Intifada, 2000-2003) from Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) news services, including 87 suicide attackers.[1] Majorities of militants
were unmarried males (20-29 yrs.), from families with both parents living and 8-15 siblings, and who
completed secondary school or attended college. Suicide attackers, which included bombers (29
Hamas, 18 PIJ) and shooters (14 Hamas, 26 PIJ), had more pronounced tendencies in these directions.
A majority of Hamas bombers attended college; PIJ had more shooters aged 14-19. Majorities of
bombers, but few shooters, had prior histories of arrest or injury by Israel’s army; however, most
shooters had one or more family members with such histories. This underscores a speculation in GST
that personal grievance could be a greater factor in Palestinian cases than for Al-Qaeda and its
ideological allies.[2] According to Princeton economist Alan Krueger and colleagues, although one
third of Palestinians live in poverty, only 13 percent of Palestinian suicide bombers do; 57 percent of
bombers have education beyond high school versus 15 percent of the population of comparable age.[3]
In response to GST, sources with the U.S. Army Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided
me summaries of interrogations with detainees at Guantanamo, Cuba (case lists remain classified). Al-
Qaeda operatives are mostly divided into “Saudis” (who tend to be “leaders”) versus “Yemenis” (more
“foot soldiers”). The Saudis are often “educated above reasonable employment level, a surprising
number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families.” Motivation and commitment are
evident in willingness to sacrifice material and emotional comforts (families, jobs, physical security),
and to pay their own way from their homes to travel long distances. Many told interrogators that if
released from detention they would return to Jihad.[4] Detainees evince little history of personal
grievance, but frequently cite older relatives and respected community members who participated in
earlier Jihads as influencing decisions to join the fight. Yemenis have more modest education and
social status, and are often recruited and financed through mosques in Yemen and abroad (especially
England). As with Hamas and PIJ, religious indoctrination by Al-Qaeda and allies (of recruits who
initially express only moderate religiosity) appears crucial to creating intimate cells of fictive kin
whose members commit to willingly die for one another.[5]
All 9/11 attackers, including 15 Saudis and 4 others of Middle Eastern origin, were young,
single males from middle class families. Their university-enabled ideological conversion to a radical
religious agenda resemble the path of many other political terrorists. No “personality” defects were
evident before the attack, and none discovered in hindsight (despite intense scrutiny).
If terrorist cells relied on maladjusted people, “they couldn’t produce effective and reliable
killers,” according to Maj. Gen. Todd Stewart (ret.), who directs Ohio State’s Program in International
and Homeland Security.[6,7] As for leaders, the usual description of their “personality type” is that of
closed-minded “authoritarians” who reduce persons to situations, and maintain their beliefs against
challenges by limiting their experiences and surrounding themselves with sources of information that
will tell them they are right (including like-minded people).[8] This description may apply somewhat
to most leaders of ruling or militant political and religious groups, with no special relation to terrorism.
Dwindling Expectations (vs. The War on Poverty). GST presented evidence against claims
by government, media and intellectual leaders that poverty and lack of education as such are reliable
factors in suicide terrorism,[9,10] which suggests that “the War on Poverty” will not significantly
affect the “War on Terrorism.” This is not to deny the role of economic factors or individual
considerations of utility in stimulating terrorism, such as those that arise from explosive population
growth,[11] combined with failure of rigidly authoritarian governments to provide initiatives for
youth.[12] Support and recruitment for suicide terrorism occur not under conditions of political
repression, poverty and unemployment or illiteracy as such, but when converging political, economic
and social trends produce diminishing life opportunities relative to expectations, thus generating
frustrations that radical organizations exploit.[13] Societies are most liable to tolerate revolutionary
acts of terrorism after people have already begun experiencing increased education, steps toward
prosperity and some political opening, but then see their rising aspirations stymied
In fact, the greater a person’s human capital (including income and education), the greater that
person’s awareness of future needs, and the greater the person’s degree of altruism and commitment to
the future generation’s welfare. This is the economic rationale for the emergence of dynastic
families,[14] and also anchors devotion to social causes that require understanding the future (e.g.,
conservation movements). Through indoctrination of recruits into emotionally tight-knit
« brotherhoods » of ficitive kin, charismatic leaders create culturally-contrived cell loyalties that
mimic and (at least temporarily) override genetically-based fidelities to family kin while securing
belief in sacrifice to a larger group cause.  
This helps to account for terrorism’s spread but not its spark. Most people in the world who
suffer stifling, even murderous oppression don’t become terrorists. As with nearly all creators and
leaders of history’s terror movements,[15] those who conceive of using suicide terrorism in the first
place belong mostly to an intellectual elite possessing sufficient material means for personal
advancement. What motivates them is religious or ideological conviction and zeal, whose founding
assumptions cannot be rationally scrutinized, and which they get others to believe in and die for.
This doesn’t mean that sponsors of martyrdom are irrational. On the contrary, use of religious
assumptions for political or economic purposes can be eminently rational, as in martyrdom or
missionary actions to gain recognition, recruits and power. Dwindling returns on future life prospects
for individuals translate into increasing recruitment and prompt returns for terrorist organizations and
leaders. This degree of manipulation usually works, however, only if the manipulators themselves are
convinced of what they are doing. As in displays of love and willingness to avenge, sincere conviction
best convinces others.[16]
Moderating Ambitions (vs. The War of Ideas). Countering terrorism also requires facing
problems with our society’s appraisals and actions. A National Research Council study finds:
“terrorism and its supporting audiences appear to be fostered by policies of extreme political
repression and discouraged by policies of incorporating both dissident and moderate groups
responsibly into civil society and the political process.”[17] President Bush told Congress that the 9/11
attackers and their supporters “hate our freedoms” and democracy.[18] But surveys show Moslem and
Arab opinion strongly favoring America’s forms of government, personal liberty, educational
opportunity and economic choice, despite support for Al-Qaeda’s actions.[19]
There is little evidence to underwrite the call for a « War of Ideas » that is a cornerstone of the
U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT).[20] Political scientist Mark Tessler finds
Arab attitudes to American culture most favorable among young adults (regardless of their religious
feeling) – the same population that terrorist recruiters single out.[21] This pattern belies the thesis of a
“clash of civilizations,”[22] or the more self-centered claim of “a clash between civilization and those
who would destroy it” that concludes NSCT. Most Muslims polled favor elected government and free
enterprise, but many do not consider these sufficient or even necessary conditions for a good life or
legitimate government.[19] Upholding cultural identity and personal security are also crucial.
It is arguably not America’s internal liberties these people dislike, but its external actions.[23]
They are not so much jealous of America as hostile to a perceived jumble of realpolitik and the
messianic mission. According to the new National Security Strategy of the United States, preemptive
action is justified against those who oppose “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,” as the “single
sustainable model for national success… right and true for every person, in every society.”[24] Yet,
there seems to be a direct correlation between U.S. military aid to politically corroded or ethnically
divided states,[25] human rights abuses by those regimes, and rise in terrorism,[26] as initially
moderate opposition is pushed into common cause with more radical elements.[17] Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch regularly document “horrific” and “massive” humans rights
abuses occurring in countries that receive the most U.S. aid in absolute terms (Israel,[27] Egypt,[28]
Colombia,[29] Pakistan[30]) and the greatest relative increase in aid (Central Asian Republics,[31]
Georgia,[32] Turkey[33]), including many “new Partners in the War on Terrorism.”[34] French
involvement in Algeria and Russian actions in Chechnya show somewhat similar developments.
A key “lesson” of the Vietnam War, according to former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara,
was to err in thinking “we're on a mission. We weren't then and we aren't today. And we shouldn't act
unilaterally militarily under any circumstances. We don’t have the God-given right to shape every
nation to our own image.”[35] America may be the world’s “indispensable nation,” as President
Clinton avowed,[36] but not if it goes it alone.
Suicide Terrorism’s Growing Strategic Importance (and Counterstrategies). Suicide
attacks by terrorist organizations have become more prevalent globally, gaining in strategic
importance with disruptive effects that cascade upon the political, economic and social routines of
national life and international relations. According to a Congressional Report released in August 2003,
suicide attacks from 1980 through 2001 represented 3 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide but
accounted for nearly half of all deaths.[37] The past three years have seen more suicide attacks than
the last quarter century, the last year (2003) accounting for more than any year in contemporary
history.[38] Since 2000, more than 300 attacks have killed some 5350 people in 17 countries. At least
70 percent of these attacks were religiously motivated, with over 100 attacks by Al-Qaeda and
affiliates (Table 1). More ominously, Islamic jihadi groups are now networked in ways that permit
‘‘swarming’’ by actors contracted from many different groups homing in on multiple targets, then
dispersing to form new swarms. Multiple coordinated suicide attack across countries and even
continents is the adaptive hallmark of Al Qaeda’s continued global web-making.[40] The London-
based International Institute of Strategic Studies surmises that: “The counter-terrorism effort has
perversely impelled an already highly decentralized and evasive transnational terrorist network to
become more ‘virtual’ and protean and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralize.”[41]
Repeated suicide actions in Israel/Palestine, Pakistan/Kashmir/India, Russia/Chechnya, and
now in U.S.-occupied Iraq show that massive counterforce alone does not stop, or even reliably
diminish, frequency of suicide attack (though it may stem increase),[42] and that suicide attacks often
achieve attackers’ near-term strategic goals (forcing withdrawal from areas subject to attack, radically
upsetting life routines in order to destabilize and demonstrate vulnerability).[43] This indicates a
lengthy and costly “war of attrition” between suicide attackers and their foes is increasingly likely.
The longer this war of attrition lasts, the greater the long-term strategic risk of radicalizing
Muslim sentiment against us around the world, of undermining our own international alliances, and of
causing serious and sustained discontent at home. As with international and civil wars tracked over the
last two centuries[44], political scientist Robert Axelrod shows that most casualties and cascading
effects of terrorist acts are caused by a few, increasingly clustered and massive operations planned
over months and years (and long-term planning is Al-Qaeda’s hallmark).[45] This striking trend (a
straight line on a log-log scale) makes it imperative that effective countermeasures be found to avoid
catastrophic devastation and disruption. “God has ordered us to build nuclear weapons,” proclaimed
Fazlur Rahman Khalil of Harkat ul-Mujahideen.[46] A subsequent attack on India’s Parliament by
Jaish-e-Muhammed, a Pakistani offshoot of the Al-Qaeda affiliate that Khalil heads, probably brought
nuclear war closer than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.[47]
One research priority should be to explore how best “netwar” may be waged against
increasingly high-tech,[48] networked terrorist groups that are seeking WMDs from multiple criminal
and other non-state sources in order to pursue what physicist Richard Garwin terms “megaterror.”[49]
Disabling and defending against relatively diffuse, horizontal social networks of control and command
may require very different risk assessments and tactics than those used to combat the vertical social
hierarchies that direct national armies. Carnegie Mellon’s Kathleen Carley has used multi-agent
network analysis to monitor and model changes in Al-Qaeda, such as those following break up of the
cell responsible for the suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania.[50] She found that
eliminating leaders who are central actors (having the most ties to other cell members and to other
cells) can produce more adaptive responses in the overall network “healing” process than elimination
of less central actors. This indicates that targeted assassinations – a favorite Israeli tactic – can be
counterproductive, regardless of any civilian reaction.
At a minimum, an effective strategy for combating suicide terrorism requires a layered approach
that works on three levels in a coordinated way:
- A last line of defense involves the attempt to protect sensitive populations and installations
from attack. Mostly through development and use of scientific technology, efforts are made to
block suicide terrorists from hitting their targets or to lessen (through preparation) the effects
of an attack that has not been prevented.
- A middle line of defense involves preemptively penetrating and destroying terror
organizations and networks, mostly through a combination of intelligence and military action.
- A first line of defense involves understanding and acting on the root causes of terrorism so as
to drastically reduce the receptivity of potential recruits to the message and methods of terror-
sponsoring organizations, mostly through political, economic, and social action programs.
Ever since September 11, 2001, hundreds of billions of dollars have been targeted on countermeasures
associated with the last and middle lines of defense (protection, mitigation, preemption). These
measures have undoubtedly helped to thwart a steep rise in suicide attacks; however, they have
produced no appreciable decline in incidence of suicide terrorism (Table 1) – the most readily
identifiable and generally devastating and destabilizing form of terrorism.[51]
The number of people outside of government who are trained and qualified to analyze terrorist
organizations and the cultural support that sustains them is quite small in the United States, and
meager elsewhere. Western academic institutions do not, as a rule, support terrorism studies as a
discipline that merits long-term funding or intellectual dedication because of wariness over devoting
resources to a politically-charged field whose relevance depends upon changing perceptions of threats
and policy priorities. In an age of globalized information, there is potentially much more to be gained
through freely accessed open sources than through classified sources (CIA and DIA analysts maintain
that much of the information needed to “connect the points” before 9/11 was available from open
sources). This situation of generally open-access to information facilitates joint civilian and military
education programs and encourages long-term cooperative ventures between academic institutions,
NGOs and government, akin to those established in order to manage the tensions and threats to
national survival and global security during the Cold War. Reliance on government alone is too risky.
Table 1. Suicide attacks worldwide, 2000-2003.
Country
# suicide attacks per
year per country # total # religious # total dead
2000 2001 2002 2003 attacks attacks in all attacks
Afghanistan** 2 2 2 11
Chechnya/Russia** 8 1 1 10 20 20 382
China 2 2 0 5
Indonesia** 1 1 2 2 215
Iraq** 33 33 15 244
Kashmir/Jammu** 17 29 18 11 75 75 409
Kenya* 1 1 1 18
Morocco** 5 5 5 44
Pakistan** 2 2 4 4 84
Palestine/Israel 3 40 64 22 129 78 555
Philippines** 1 1 2 2 24
Saudi Arabia* 1 5 6 6 57
Sri Lanka*** 14 4 1 19 0 205
Tunisia** 1 1 1 16
Turkey** 1 5 6 4 64
USA* 4 4 4 3002
Yemen* 1 1 1 19
SUM 43 80 91 98 312 220 5354
*Al-Qaeda attacks
** Involvement of Al-Qaeda associates
***LTTE attacks (Tamil Tigers)
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